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The Neo-Babylonian period in Mesopotamia is characterized by important developments, of
such importance that historians are led to analyse it as a time of organization of a new kind of economy.
This  paper  focuses  on  the  way those  developments  may  have  influenced  the  exchanges  of  goods
imported from outside Mesopotamia. We first It will firstly describe these exchanges, and the actors
who are in charge of them. Second, wely, it will focus on how the transformations which thoroughly
changed the institutional  and geographical  background during  the  period  may have  influenced the
overall organization of long distance trade. We will especially try to explain the puzzling fact that Neo-
Babylonian  actors,  who  were  so  often  involved  in  long-distance  trade  in  former  times,  seems  to
withdraw nearly entirely from this activity, at the very time when new and lucrativ camel-transport
trade appears in the Near-East.
 As usual in assyriology, this research is heavily reliant upon ancient evidence, which, for our
subject, comes mainly from institutional sources. Neo-Babylonian age is one of the best documented
period of ancient mesopotamian history, with thousands of texts from private and temple archives1.
Private  texts  belong to families  of  more  or  less  well-established notables,  involved in  agricultural
management,  houses or field rentals.  But their  archives  rarely mention trade,  and very rarely long
distance trade2. The most explicit references to importation of exotic products are to be found in the
numerous  texts  produced  by  the  administration  of  the  two  main  temples  of  Neo-Babylonian
Mesopotamia,  Eanna  of  Uruk,  and  Ebabbar  of  Sippar.  Some of  them mention  regularly  imported
products, and give us some idea of how they where brought to Mesopotamia, and exchanged there. 
The best known and most studied texts have already been gathered by Oppenheim in an article3
* HISCANT-MA, Université de Lorraine/Orient et Méditerranée, Paris.
1 Jursa 2005.
2 Several archives belong to private entrepreneurs dealing with trade. The most complete one, Iddin-Marduk's, and is part
of Egibi's archive. Iddin-Marduk is a medium scale businessman. He buys agricultural staples in the countryside around
Babylon, to sell them in the city. Wunsch 1993, Jursa 2010, p. 214-224. Others smaller archives dealing with local trade
are to be found in Neo-Babylonian evidence. Sîn-ilī's archiv, from Babylon, describes the business activities of Ţābia.
Unlike Iddin-Marduk,  Ţābia does not buy agricultural products, but takes control of agricultural land. Other archives
shed light  on the trade of  agricultural  staples:  one of  their  distinguishing feature  is  the  relatively high number of
“harrānu” contracts they include: those partnership agreements are commonly used by businessmen to gather funds for
their  activities:  they  are  to  be  found  in  Nippur,  Uruk,  Larsa,  Sippar  of  Kiš (Jursa  2010,  p.  218-219).  But  those
businessmen usually limited their activities to their cities' hinterland, even if their area of influence depends of the actual
size of the city: it is larger around Babylon than around a smaller city like Larsa. One would have expected to find texts
related to long distance trade amoung the  harrānu contracts, furthermore because the actual name of those contracts
refers to caravan trade. But those contracts are used to gather capital for various reasons, and very few of them explicitly
refer to trade. The only exception is the text GC II 84, where a special clause requires that the capital be divided once
one of the contractors comes back from a specific journey. Most harranu contracts are cited by Lanz 1976, p. 140.
3 Oppenheim 1969. On those textes, see more recently Joannès 1997, Graslin-Thomé 2009.
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which has been for a long time the authority on Neo-Babylonian long-distance trade.  Oppenheim's
article was based on a thorough analysis of two texts who take the form of a list of foreign goods,
associated with a price in silver. One text, quoted above, YOS VI 168, is dated from the 7 th day of
tašritu, in the 6th year of Nabonidus. Several foreign goods are associated with their value in silver.
Some iron and dyed wool will be given as tithe4 on behalf on two agents, which name is given by the
end of the text: Nādin-ahi and Šamaš-zēr-ibni. The second text, TCL 12, 845, dated one year and two
days before the first6 list a consignment related to the sole Nādin-ahi, and does not give the silver value
of the entries.
YOS VI 168
600 minas of copper from Yamana, at 3 minas 20 shekels of silver,
81 minas 20 shekels of inzahurētu-dye at 2 minas 2 shekels
37 minas of tin at 551/2 shekels of silver,
16 minas 15 shekels of takiltu-dyed wool at 2 minas 40 shekels,
all this :   related to Šamaš-zēr-ibni, son of Nanaya-iddin.
295 minas of copper from Yamana, at 1 mina 381/3 shekels,
55 minas of lapis-lazuli, at 36 2/3 shekels
153 minas of ţumanu-fibers at 1 mina 42 shekels,
233 minas 20 shekels of inzahurētu-dye at 481/2 shekels,
130 minas of iron from Yamana at 32 ½ shekels,
257 minas of iron from Lebanon at 42 2/3 shekels
132 quarts of assorted honey, at 26 shekels,
20 jars of white wine at 1 mina,
120 minas of hūratu-dye, at 30 shekels
40 minas of hashaltu-spice (?) at 2 shekels
1 kurru-measure of taturru-spice (?) at 10 shekels
1 kurru-measur of juniper resin at 3 shekels
all this related to Nādin-ahi.
Date : tašritu, 7th day, year 6 of Nabonidus, king of Babylon. 3 minas 10 shekels of the
takilty-dyed wool are the tithe of Nādin-ahi, 5 minas of the takiltu-dyed wool and 40
minas of the iron ar the «tithe» of Šamaš-zēr-ibni.
Since  the  publication  of  Oppenheim's  work,  the  knowledge  on  Neo-Babylonian  economy
improved significantly, thanks to the renewal of texts publications, and the numerous scholar studies on
Neo-Babylonian history completed in the last years7. According to Oppenheim's wish, expressed at the
end of his article, a few texts have been added to the list of documents related to long distance trade he
managed to gather, some of them come from the administration of the Eanna temple in Uruk and one
from Ebabbar, the temple of Sippar. Historians now deal with a small dossier of about ten texts, all of
them produced by temple administration, which content share strong similarities to the texts known by
Oppenheim. Some consist of a list of imported products, linked to a quantity and a value in silver 8.
Others  are  contracts  concluded  between  temples  and  middlemen  employed  by  the  sanctuaries  to
4 On tithe, see now Jursa 1998.
5 Oppenheim 1969, p. 236-237, Joannès 1997, p. 192-193, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 38-39.
6 This date is probably mistaken, the two texts could be related to the same matter. Joannès 1997, Graslin-Thomé 2009, 
p. 41-42.
7 Jursa 2010 is a important overview on Neo-Babylonian economy which dramatically improved our general knowledge 
on babylonian economy. But very few pages are devoted to long distance trade (p. 224-225).
8 YOS VI 168, PTS 2098, TCL XII 84.
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provide typical imported produces such as dyes and metals9. These texts are quite similar in format
regardless of whether they originate in Eanna or in Ebabbar. In some cases10,  it  is recorded in the
contract that the intermediaries had to travel to procure the exotic products, often called  mereštu,  in
distant places. Due to strong similarities between the texts, it is probably the case even when nothing is
specified on this subject. Contracts refer once to Chaldea11 and more often to Eber-nari12. One text adds
that the consignment has to be bought according to the prize of the city of Thapsuhu, probably the city
called Thapsacus in classical texts, located in northern Syria13:
BM 61088
[2]+1 ma-na KÙ-BABBAR NÍG-GA dUTU a-na [KASKAL-II (?)]
šá e-bi-ÍD ina muh-hi mdEN-M[U A-šú šá]
mLe-šir A mDÙ-eš-DINGIR u4-mu šá
ul-tu e-bi-ÍD ir-ru-ub
a-ki-i ma-hi-ir šá uru Ta-ap-su-hu
hi-ši-ih-tu4 šá É-KUR šá KÙ-BABBAR-a' 3 ma-na
mdEN-MU a-na NÍG-GA dUTU i-nam-din
[ina] GUB-zu šá mdEN-TIN-iţ lúSANGA UD.KIB.NUNKI
3 mina's of silver, property of Šamaš for [the trade venture] of Transpotamia, is
against the account of Bēl-iddin [son of] Lēširu of the Epeš-ili family. When he returns
from Transpotamia, Bēl-iddin shall pay this 3 mina's of silver, the temple's requirement,
according to the rate of the city of Tapsuhu. In the presence of Bēl-Uballiţ the šangû of
Sippar. Witnesses. Date.
The different contracts have strong similarities. The temples provided one or two middlemen
with capital, either in silver or in goods. Those middlemen had to deliver, in exchange, some goods
which are often listed, after a unspecified timeframe. The temples and the intermediaries were bound
by contracts,  but  do not  appear  to  have shared  long-term relations.  In  one example  at  least14,  the
contract  was  not  honored  by  the  middlemen,  and  was  eventually  ruled  by  a  court  decision.  The
middlemen enjoyed a relative liberty in decision making: the list of products is sometimes fixed, but
neither prices nor timeframe are.  This allowed a degree of freedom in order to be able to react to
unexpected events, something necessary in the the highly unpredictable context of long-distance trade.
Remunerations are not mentioned either, but one text15 stipulates that the travelers will have to pay the
temple a tithe from their personal profits: the transaction negotiated with the temples is one of many
arranged by the agent as part of this journey. It is impossible to know for certain who initiated these
expeditions. The temples may have been the instigators, but more probably they contributed capital for
an expedition organized independently by merchants who are not temple staff.
It is not clear either who were exactly the agents traveling on behalf of the sanctuaries. Their
status is usually not mentioned. The text PTS 3068 is the only exception: 
9    YOS VII 63, Nbn 637, BM 61088 = Macginnis 2004, p. 30-31, McEwan 1984, GC II 111, PTS 3068 = Kleber 2008, 
p. 327-328, YOS VI 52, YOS VI 61. AnOr VIII 70 and YOS XIX 1 are related to long distance trade as well.
10 YOS VII 63, BM 61088 = Macginnis 2004, p. 30-31, McEwan 1984, YOS VI, 62.
11 One text, PTS 3068 quoted below.
12 YOS VII 63, BM 61088, McEwan 1984, YOS VI 52, YOS VI 61, 
13 BM 61088 = Macginnis 2004, p. 30-31. On the localisation of Thapsacus, see Graslin-Lemaire 2004.
14 AnOr VIII 70.
15 YOS VI 168.
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PTS 3068
3 ma-na kù-babbar šám 12 gun síghi-a
níg-na dgašan ša unugki u dna-na-a
ina muh-hi mdingir-sag-ia-uru lú-sag-lugal
a-na hi-ših-tu4 šá é-an-na kù-sig17 zabar
ù me-reš-tu4 a-ki-i šá ina kur tam-tì
i-mah-ha-ru a-na é-an-na i-nam-dim
ki-i mé-reš-tu4 pa-ni lúqí-i-pi
u lú šà-tam la ta-an-da-har
kù-babbar a4 3 ma-na a-na é-an-na
i-nam-din e-lat ú-ìl-tì šá {ma}-mah-[  ]
šá ina muh-hi-šú
ina gub-zu šá mmu-še-zib-damar-utu lúqi-i-pi
šá é-an-na mba-ni-ia lúšà-tam é-an-n[a]
a-šú šá mtab-né-e-a a lúšu-ha
Scribes
Witnesses, date (22 du'zū, first year of Nabonid)
Three mina's of silver, property of the lady of Uruk and Nanāja, price of twelve talents
of wool, is against the account of Ilu-rēšia-uşur, servant of the king. According to the
temple's requirement, he will pay gold, bronze and other trade goods to eanna, as he
will find them in Meerland. In case the qīpu and the šatammu are not happy with those
trade goods, he will give 3 minas of silver to Eanna. This is in addition to the earlier
deficit  owed  by  him.  Done  on  behalf  of  Mušezib-Marduk,  qīpu of  Eanna,  Bānia,
šatammu of Eanna, son of Tabnēa, of the Bā'iru family.
The clauses of this contract are similar to other texts referring to the delivery of exotic goods at
Eanna temple,  but it is the only one to records that the goods will be provided by a royal agent, Ilu-
rēšia-uşur,  ša reš šarri. Ilu-rēšia-uşur  will receive wool in exchange.  It is well known that, in some
times of mesopotamian history, royal agents played an important role for the importation of exotic
products in Mesopotamia16.  The mention of  Ilu-rēšia-uşur, ša reš šarru,  in the above mentioned text
may seem to fit pretty well in this context. As the similarities between the texts are strong, it could
sound tempting to argue that royal  agents were usually  involved in this  context.  However,  despite
similarities  with  the  other  texts  dealing  with  import  of  exotic  goods,  this  example  may  not  be
particularly significant. The goods are to be found in Chaldea, and not in Transpotamia as in other
texts. Furthermore, the final clause differs from the other texts: it  mentions that the sanctuary may
reject the exotics goods if they do not serve its needs. This could mean that the procedure and the
intermediary are unusual, and that the temple administrators are not sure what to expect from them17. 
This small “dossier” gives information a specific form of of supply of exotics goods to the main
temples of Babylonia: they used long-distance expeditions led by travelers who did not seem to belong
to regular staff of the sanctuaries. The kind of relation between the temple administration and external
16 Radner 1999 for neo-assyrian period. However, it it possible that, even in neo-assyrian period, private merchants were 
acting in regional and maybe long-distance trade as well. Merchants active in regional trade are known in Aššur (Radner 
2008). 
17 In contrast to other texts dealing with exotics goods, the main subject of PTS 3068 is the selling of wool by the temple. 
In this case, the implication of a royal agent is not unusual. Kleber 2008, p. 243-246, showed that the palace is the main 
buyer of Eanna's surpluses of wool. It is also not unfrequent that this wool was not exchanged against money, but against
goods not produced in Eanna's household (Jursa 2010). Is the case of PTS 3068, the temple administrators seem to have 
taken the opportunity of their business relation with somebody who usually travels in Chaldea, a usual place to buy gold,
to fill its stocks in this metal.
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businessmen  to  whom the  administrators  entrust  part  of  the  temple  activites  is  now well  known,
particularly since M. Jursa's studies on Neo-Babylonian administration18: central administration of Neo-
Babylonian  temples  seem  to  mainly  control  the  economic  activities  performed  in  the  immediate
vicinity of the central administration. They delegate numerous tasks to outsiders, especially when those
tasks are not done in the immediate vicinity of the temple19. In this way, goods entering or leaving the
urban workshops and the main storehouses are accurately recorded, while land work or more generally
any activities being carried out further from the central administration are only loosely accounted. The
control  on  such  activities,  which  is  more  difficult  to  operate  for  the  central  administration,  is
subcontracted to outsiders. The temple provides them with lands, tools, and seeds, and requires, in
exchange, the delivery of a part of the crop. This way, temple administrators free themselves from the
burden of controlling a unwieldy number of cultivators and herdsmen, and remain in direct relationship
with only a limited number of business men20. Purchases which relate to longer distance trade proceed
in  a  similar  way.  Logistics  of  the  organization  of  the  trade  expedition  are  subcontracted  to
intermediaries, despite the fact that this choice limits the profit-opportunity, and even the possibility to
directly choice the required goods.
However, in spite of the considerable quantities provided by these expeditions, they were not
sufficient to cater for day-to-day needs of the sanctuaries. One of the best documented example21 is the
purple dyed clothes. The takiltu is the more common purple used in the temple, it is an imported good,
coming from the West22. The amount of takiltu-dyed fabrics used in Neo-Babylonian temples cannot be
evaluated accurately23, but partial data can be found in some documents. The lubāru, piece of fabric
used during lubuštu celebration, requires half a mina of takiltu dyed wood24. The quantities imported
from Transpotamia in TCL XII 84, 11 minas 22 shekel, could seems to be enough to cover those needs.
But a few texts25 show that the temples administrators are looking for other sources of supply. Some
texts mentions silver delivery for takiltu: in Nbn 262, 37 shekels of silver remains from a silver delivery
for  takiltu, in  nbn 1101 2 shekels ¾ of silver are delivered for 16 shekels of  takiltu. Those exemple
show that there was a way to get  takiltu against money, outside of the big commercial expeditions
illustrated by Oppenheim's texts. This is confirmed by an unpublished letter cited by M. Jursa26 where a
men called Nusku-hanania is exploring the country, looking for different products, among them purple. 
Iron  is  an  exemple  of  imported  product  whose  need  exceeds  the  amount  listed  in  the
Oppenheim's texts. In YOS VI 168, 4 talents 17 minas of lebanese iron are imported alongside with 2
talents 10 minas 8 shekels ½ of iron from Yamana. The volume is important, but less than the amount
of  iron  (10 talents)  given by Eanna to  Šum-ukīn  and Kalbā  according to  their  agreement  of  rent
farming27. Even if iron is regularly imported by the trade expedition kwnown through Oppenheims's
texts,  those  expeditions  cannot  be  enough  to  provide  the  iron  required  for  the  whole  agricultural
activities of the temples. Purchase of iron is, unsurprisingly, cited in several texts from the temples
18 Jursa 1995, Jursa 2004.
19 Jursa 2010.
20 Joannès 2000, p. 115, Jursa 2011.
21 Thanks, mainly, to Zawadski 2006.
22 On takiltu, see Zawadski 2006, p. 23, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 196-204.
23 BM 101905, quoted by Zawadski 2006, p. 48, is unfortunately to badly preserved to even know if this «summary text» 
dating from the beginning of Darius' reign sums up the amount of takiltu wool used or left each year.
24 Zawadski 2006, p. 87.
25 Nbn 262, 37 shekels of silver left from amount given for the purchase of takiltu. Nbn 1101, 2 shekels ¾ of silver given 
for 16 shekels of takiltu. For the prices of takiltu, Zawadski 2006, p. 109, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 203.
26 BM 103491, Jursa 2004b, p. 163.
27 Cocquerillat 1968, p. 39.
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archives28. 
An other way for the temples to get exotic goods is to be mentioned: royal gifts. Numerous texts
record gifts from the king, mainly gold, but other commodities are mentioned as well 29. Once again, a
link is missing in the chain, and the texts do not mention how these products came in royal storehouses.
One  can  think  of  tribute  and  other  forced  imports  such  as  those  well  recorded  in  Neo-Assyrian
evidence30. In one case, one can be more affirmative: most records of iron from Hume, in Cilicia, found
in Ebabbar archives date from the reign of Nabonidus31. They are probably gifts given by the king from
the booty taken during military campaigns of the begin of his reign. In this case, exceptionally, we are
maybe able to answer to the often open question to know how exotic goods were imported.
To sum up, ancient evidence mainly records importations of exotic goods made by institutions,
temples or palace. They organized military or pacific expeditions to bring back in Mesopotamia the
mereštu required for their all-day use. But huge incertitudes remains to explain import of exotic goods.
Even if the quantities mentioned are important, they cannot cover more than a part of the needs. One
has  therefore  the  feeling  that  the  importation  of  exotic  goods  best  evidenced  in  our  texts,  big
expeditions  to  Transpotamia  or  gifts  made  by  the  king  on  the  tribute  bought  back  from military
campaigns provide the main stocks of the temples, while punctual needs were bought otherwise. 
Actually, scattered references in the texts show that part of the needs are provided through local
or  regional  purchase.  The main trading center  was Babylon,  the political,  religious,  and economic
center of this period32.  The highest administrators of the babylonian temples regularly travel to the
capital, for political, religious or economic reasons. Some of them even owned property there. Some
senior  administrators  of  the  temples  or  craftsmen  usually  working for  the  sanctuary  were,  in  this
context, commissioned to buy there some exotics goods, on top of their usual task for the temples33.
TBER 6734 shows how Amurru-šar-uşur, qīpu35 of Eanna, took advantage of his travel to Babylon for
unknown but probably extra-economic purposes to bring back some terebinth. The new year's and akitu
feast required the travel of most high administrators of Eanna to Babylon, as well as people from all
over  Babylonia.  As  usual,  in  Mesopotamia36 and  elsewhere,  those  religious  feasts  provided  good
opportunities for business. In other cases, the temples sent specialists to Babylon, to buy commodities
related to their craft: it was the best way to ensure of the quality of the purchased goods, to entrust to
the specialists accustomed to use it the task to buy it. In Ebabbar, the master bronze craftsman (?),
Libluţ, chose the tin necessary for his craft in Babylon37. In Eanna, Bēl-ibni, the son of Nādin, and his
28 TBER 67, Iron bought at Babylon. Iron bought in Sippar amoung other local products in Nbn 428. Silver against iron in 
YOS XVII 229.
29 Kleber 2008, p. 265. Gold is by far the more common gift, but the king sometimes gives some gifts in kind, like grain, 
dattes or cattle.
30 For neo-assyrian booties, see Jankowska 1969, Liverani 1992, Graslin-Thomé 2009. Neo-Babylonians booties are not as
precisely described in royal inscriptions that they are in neo-assyrian times, but the building inscriptions, and the 
important building projects held in Neo-Babylonian Babylon are reliable witnesses of the amount to goods imported by 
Neo-Babylonian armies. Jursa 2010, p. 3.
31 CT 55 244, Nbn 571, YOS VI 210, CT 56 386. 
32 Jursa 2010, p. 63-79 underlines the importance of Babylon, where converges most human and economic wealth of 
Babylonia.
33 The list of goods, exotic or not, purchased in Babylon, are cited by Jursa 2010, p. 74-75: metal, silver, textiles, dyed 
wool, aromatics or precious stones are recorded.
34 Joannès 1982, p. 246-248, text nº60.
35 Litteraly qīpu means «trustee», Beaulieu 1989 translates as «administrator», Bongenaar 1997 as «resident».
36 Biga 2002, for second millennium ancient orient, Chandezon 2000 for ancient Greece.
37 BM 75281 = Bongenaar 1997, p. 378.
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son Hašdāia, are mentioned in several texts38 related to the purchase of gold or other long distance trade
products in Babylon. In this cases, the goods are purchased against silver, which, as M. Jursa showed
recently turns to be more and more used for economic exchanges during the VIth century39.
There is no way to know how the commodities have been brought in Babylon, and no way,
either, to know how they have been purchased. Our texts, written by local administrators, only care for
the amount of products bought, record sometimes the name of sellers, but never explain how the sellers
got the products they provide to the temple emissaries. 
There is only one exception, but it may be very specific as it concerns gold trade. Finding gold
was apparently relatively easy in Babylonia: gold is never mentioned among commodities brought back
from Transpotamia by the caravans described above. A reason of that is that there is no gold mine in the
Levant40, the gold seems to arrive from Egypt, India, maybe Iran. The temples supply partly themselves
in the South, through exchange with the Sealand administration41. But an other part of the supply is
bought in Babylon. Members of the temple staff bought it there in small quantities42, of a few shekels,
from various merchants. TBER 67 or YOS VI 112 mention a amazing number of sellers. Each seller
probably sold all the gold he could. One would not understand, otherwise, why the Eanna agents would
have reasonless multiply the suppliers. A royal merchant is listed among sellers, but there is no way to
know if he is acting on his own or for the palace. Despite the fact that some merchants are related to the
palace, the multiplicity of sellers does not advocate for a centralized trade organized by the state. It
looks more like a decentralized trade, in hands of individuals, who do not belong to an institution. They
do not seem to be professional gold sellers either, the quantities of gold sold are to small, and one can
think of travelers taking advantage of their stay in Babylon to take some business43. The opportunity to
sell small quantities of gold also explain the cupidity of thieves, whose gold thefts are recorded in some
legal texts44: they would not risk the huge penalties they face if they had no way to exchange the stolen
gold.
The fact that agents from the sanctuaries are able to buy, in Babylon, imported commodities
shows that these products circulated within Babylonia, through other channels than those appearing in
the texts from the temples. Babylon is the main economic center, but some textual evidence confirms
that some exotics goods are to be found in Uruk or Sippar. They are few of them, but enough to show
that Ebabbar bought, against silver, several exotic goods such as dyed wool (Nbn 637), iron or dyes
(Nbn 428) or gold (BM 74411). Such purchases are known in Enna as well, where the sums involved
are significant45.
In these cases, only the names of the sellers are known, neither their status nor the way they get
the commodites are detailed. They deliver both exotic and local products. As an example Šula, during
38 TBER 68-69, YOS VI 115, TBER 67, YOS VI 112.
39 Jursa 2010, p. 772-780. In private archives, high-value commodities like animals or slaves are systematically bought 
against silver. In temples as well, use of money becomes common, contrary to the practices revealed by VIIIth century 
archives.
40 Moorey 1999, p. 220, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 238-240.
41 Kleber 2008, p. 326-328, Jursa 2010, p. 93-94.
42 1 shekels ¼ of gold in YOS VI 112, l. 5. Other quantities are much more important, like the more than 5 minas of gold 
bought against more than a talent of silver in YOS VI 115, l.6-7.
43 Jursa 2010 p. 64-89 lists the members of temple administration traveling to Babylon.
44 Joannès (éd) 2000, p. 214 mentions a small dossier of nine texts where several members of Eanna, among them at least 
two goldsmiths, are involved in a big network of gold misappropriation and resell.
45 Jursa 2010, p. 556-557. Dyes in GC I 170, aromatics (GC I 178), wine (GC I 395), dyed wool (YOS XIX 218) papyrus 
(GC I 92).
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Nabonid reign46, sold to Eanna both sheeps and wool and exotics products such as lead, wine, and
maybe the rare kitinnu-fabric47. He is one among the local sellers recorded in many texts in the process
of selling or buying ordinary products to the main sanctuaries of Babylonia. He, for sure, did not import
the exotic goods himself, and is only a local retailer and we have no clue to know how the goods he is
selling have been imported in Babylonia.
The positions of these sellers are many. Some sellers providing imported products such as gold,
juniper,  and  possibly  alum,  are  named  tamkarū48.  This  denomination,  which  appears  throughout
mesopotamian history, is often translated as  merchant, but is acknowledged to represent a variety of
functions49. The tamkāru, depending on period or places, can either be a merchant, a money lender, or a
royal  agent  responsible  for  importation  of  exotic  goods50.  Among  the  temple  intermediaries,  texts
occasionally mention  tamkarū  ša  šarri,  which  may be  translated  as  “king merchants”.  Since  both
denominations,  tamkāru and  tamkāru  ša  šarri,  may apparently be used one for another, M. Jursa51
suggests that both probably refer to professionals related52 to royal administration53 or working at least
partially for the king54. A lot of other sellers are not named by other means than their personnal names,
and are never labelled as tamkarū. They probably are independent sellers, acting on their own behalf,
like those known through some private archives55. There are therefore, both for local and exotic goods,
local sellers, sometimes linked to the palace, but sometimes not. 
Very scarse evidence from private archives show traders travelling long-distance, apparently on their
own purposes, which may include trade56. Donkeys used for travel, exotics goods or distante places are,
very seldom, cited in private archives. In an unpublished letter, cited by M. Jursa, a certain Sin-Ili tells
to  Ţabia that he did not managed to find the mereštu he was looking for in several cities from north
Babylonia. But the evidence is very scarse, and there is not a single text to explicity refer to direct
importation  from  distant  places.  This  fact  explains  why  the  historians  usually  think  that  the
importations were mainly done by no-babylonian57 traders.
All in all the Neo-Babylonian sources shed light principally on institutional-related exchanges:
46 Years 9 to 15.
47 Nbn 439, but the text is badly damaged, only the ki of kitinnu remains.
48 GC II 39 a tamkāru provides gold to Eanna, maybe alum in TuM2/3 251 (Dandamayev 1971, p. 76). 
49 On tamkarū in Neo-Babylonian times, Dandamayev 1971, Dandamayev 1995. Most of the time, they sell local products,
like dates or fish. 
50 Joannès 1997 p. 177, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 281-282.
51 Jursa 2010 p. 580-581 and n. 3157.
52 Jursa 2010 p. 580 and n. 3157.
53 Evidence of tamkarū is scarce in Neo-Babylonian times, in comparaison to Neo-Assyrian times. The word is to be found
less than 30 times ine Neo-Babylonian evidence according to Dandamayev's account. But that does not mean necessary 
that the function became less important : as we do not have royal archives, it is not surprising that we do not get the texts
in which traders acting for the palace are mentionned. 
54 Nothing in the evidence shows that all tamkarū are related to the palace, and directly depend from it. Part of their 
activity may be related to the palace, but they may very well acting on their owns behalf as well, for an other part of 
their activity. Joannès 1997. 
55 Two small dossiers related to traders sometimes called tamkarū are known : the royal merchant Sin-ahu-iddin 
(Dandamaev 1995) and a family of merchants of Judean extraction (Jursa 2007).
56 Jursa 2010, p. 225 sums up the very few mentions, in private archives, which can be linked to long-distance trade. Arad-
Gula, from Ea-eppēš-ilī's, sell a donkey in a syrian city (Nbk 360). Mušezib-marduk delivers 18 liters of good quality 
wine to Bel-Remanni, but it is probably only for his personnal use. In Ur, Sîn-uballitţ ask for musukkannu wood for a 
writing board (UET IV, 185), on musukannu, see Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 221-222. In Sippar, Iššar-tarībī kept in his 
archives several harrānu partnerships, and the geographical scope of his activities reaches as far as Humadešu in Iran. 
(Jursa 2005, p. 124).
57 Oppeheim1969, Jursa 2007, Jursa 2010, p. 224.
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the  investment  of  temple capitals  in  expeditions  of  varying distances,  royal  bursaries  and forcible
importations. This is not surprising: temples and palaces were the main consumers of precious goods
which  account  for  the  majority  of  imports.  But  this  view  is  also  distorted  by  the  fact  that  our
documentation generally comes from the temples: we can only look at the documentation from the end
of the chain of supply which brought these supplies to the sanctuaries. The manner in which they were
imported, the way they were distributed within Babylon is not documented: it does not matter much to
the scribes who author the texts we are considering. The very fact that the sanctuary agents could buy
from private middlemen attests to the reality that transactions existed outside the realm of the temples.
 It is therefore quite difficult to quantify the proportion of both private and institutional 
involvement in this long-distance exchange. In fact, the very question is maybe not relevant: private 
and institutional trade are not clearly separated. Many people carry out private deals on the sidelines of 
missions for the palaces and temples, or, on  the contrary, it is likely that the temples invested in 
expeditions whose initial purpose was private enterprise. We thus find a situation which is 
characteristic of the Neo-Babylonian —if not in general ancient— economy: the intimate link between 
private and institutional interests, with institutions relying upon the dynamism of businessmen who 
place themselves at the service of the palaces and sanctuaries. 
Even if the picture of trade of exotic products remains incomplete, it is less puzzling than it was 
in Oppenheim's times, and allows some reflexion on the place long distance trade had among the 
transformations which mark the beginning of the first millennium. The second part of this article will 
try to give some directions to answer this question. The methodological approach proposed here is to 
use the theoretical tools provided by the so-called New Economic History, initiated by D. C. North58. 
This school of thought, developed by economists, had some impact on ancient historians, mainly on 
those working on ancient Greece59. It has been less influent in assyriology. The purpose of this article is
not to import by force in assyriology a theoretical framework designed for an other academic field60, 
but to use one of its theoretical tools to bring some light on transformations detected in first millennium
economy.
One of the main theoretical tools proposed by D. C. North is the concept of institutions. 
D. C. North names as institutions all the rules, legal or informal, which enable exchange. How these 
institutions evolve is a considerable driving force for historical change in economy. Institutions are 
strongly related to transaction costs, defined by D. C. North as the entire costs associated with the 
exchange61. Costs of transport of course, but also costs of information, risk protection and more 
generally the total costs of arranging the set of contracts which contribute to making the exchange 
possible. These costs depend of external factors, like the state of the roads, the weather conditions, or 
the distance to mining area for example. But the institutional background is to be taken into account as 
well: cost to write contracts, to get state protection against risk, or cost of taxes for example. The 
evolution of those transaction costs, allowed or restrained by the institutions, is one of the motors of 
historical change: when transaction costs diminish, they sometimes allow new economic behavior. 
Conversely, some institutional deadlock which maintain high transaction costs can hinder necessary 
58 North 1984, 1985, 1990 [2007], North and Thomas 1973.
59 See, for example, Bresson 2007.
60 The utility of theoretical models imported from other academic fields is not a new idea in assyriology. Graslin-Thomé 
2009, p. 99-131.
61 North 2007 [1990], p. 11: «If transaction costs were simply the costs of coordinating the increasingly complex 
interdependent parts of an economy they would be simply information costs or more specifically the costs of acquiring 
the information to measure the multiple dimensions of what is being exchanged. But they are also the costs of enforcing 
agreements and making credible commitments across time and space, necessary to realize the potential of this 
technology». Transaction cost are all the costs related to exchange.
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evolutions. In the case of long distance trade, the importance of transaction costs is certainly not to be 
neglected62.
When one uses the term ‘long-distance’ one thinks especially of transport costs. These were
notoriously high in antiquity,  and often prevented the development of long distance trade, when the
costs of the journey were greater than the dividend which could be expected from the goods brought
back. During the first millennium, a number of factors changed the structuring of transport costs. The
development of new routes and the upgrading of certain principal paths to service the needs of the
empire63 were favorable to exchanges. The integration of the region into a larger political framework is
a  favorable factor  as  well.  However  the costs,  recently estimated by Michaela Weszeli64,  for local
commerce  remain  high,  especially  when  taking  into  account  the  various  local  taxes  that  were
applicable. For long-distance commerce, the extra cost associated with risk also needs to be considered.
The expeditions had to be escorted by archers. Such is the case in Sippar when the temple sends a
group of carpenters to supervise the supply of wood to a sanctuary, most likely in Lebanon65. This risk
factor increases the cost of long distance trade.
Such high transport costs, as was the case during the whole of antiquity, meant that only rare
and expensive goods were imported at all. The lists of imported goods by the above-mentioned temples
feature little more than those goods imported in earlier ages: the same metals, dyed fabrics, wine and
woods are found in the shipments66. There appears to have been no significant development in transport
costs which would have facilitated the importation of new items. Indeed, economists show  that low
transport  costs  lead  to  the  development  of  regional  specializations67.  Cities  or  regions  specialize
themselves in the productions for which they have what economists68 call a «relative advantage»: the
local supplies or specific skills allow them to product better and cheaper than other economic partners.
But,  in  order  to  direct  more  of  their  production  force  to  such  goods,  cities  have  to  give  up  the
production of  other  goods,  for  which they are not  as  productive.  They have to  import  them. This
mechanism works as soon as transport costs get low enough to allow imports for a reasonable cost.
When transportation costs are too high, it remains more profitable to locally produce goods required for
the day-to-day running of a city or region locally. In Neo-Babylonian times, very few regions specialize
in certain goods and choose to become dependent on the importation of others. It is maybe the case in
Gibeon, where thousands of storage jars have been discovered, probably designed for exportations. The
example of olive oil specialization in Ekron (Tell Miqne) is more controversial69. 
One significant factor in the development of transport costs during the first millennium is the
domestication  of  the  camel:  its  newfound use over  long distances  may be  interpreted  in  terms of
transport costs in the desert70. This development is noticeable in some Neo-Assyrian documents, where
62 North 1984, 1985.
63 For Neo-Assyrian times, see Favaro 2007, for main routes in Neo-Babylonian times, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 308-324, 
Jursa 2010, p. 62-98.
64 Weszeli, in Jursa 2010, p. 151.
65 Bongenaar 1997, p. 392-395. Some carpenters are, in Ebabbar, called LÚ NAGAR šá URU labanānu, «carpenters of 
Lebanon». When they are traveling abroad, the temple provides them travel rations, leather shoes and money to buy an 
donkey.
66 The commodities imported in IIId millenium BC are the same than the goods recorded in Oppenheim's texts. Snell 1982, 
p. 118, Faist 2001. 
67 Krugman 1991, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 325-330.
68 Following D. Ricardo.
69 Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 368-369. But see Schloen 2001, p. 141-147.
70 Bibliography on the domestication of camel is abundant. See, for example, Groom 1981, p. 33-37, Restö 2003, p. 122-
123, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 300.
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camels are often associated with arab tribes71. The importance of transport by camels are well-known
during the roman era72. However, camels are very rarely mentioned in Neo-Babylonian evidence. This
is partly due to the fact that very few documents give concrete details about the manner in which high-
value goods found their way into Mesopotamia.  When camels appear in Neo-Assyrian texts, it is in
official or royal inscriptions, those which are precisely lacking in Neo-Babylonian evidence. But this
can not be enough to explain the total absence of transport by camel in Neo-Babylonian texts: when
babylonian businessmen practice trade with distant places, the animals mentioned in texts are always
donkeys, never camels73. This gives the impression that this new means of transportation has not been
adapted by Babylonians, despite the new opportunities it allows. A puzzling conclusion, which calls for
an explanation. We will return to this question further down.
Another change of the modes of circulation which has an influence on long-distance exchanges
is the population migrations which characterize this period. First millennium witnesses both forced
movement  of  deportees74,  victims  of  Neo-Assyrian  or  Neo-Babylonian  politics  and  voluntary
migrations of Aramaic, Arab tribes or of other groups settled in Mesopotamia for various reasons. The
letters of Nippur,  which date from the middle of the eighth century,  demonstrate how a system of
exchange took place in the south of Mesopotamia between nomadic and settled groups75. While this
exchange was local in nature, commodities involved are mainly agricultural staples, it springs from
long-distance  commerce,  and  exotic  goods  like  purple  dye  are  sometimes  cited76.  It  reflects  the
settlement in the course of the eighth century of Aramaic people from Syria in the lands between
Nippur and Bit-Iakin.  It is not implausible that certain members of these tribes continued to move
around with their herds between Babylon and Habur region. Information exchanged between various
correspondents refer to certain spoken and written linguistic characteristics which demonstrate77 the
long-lasting privileged relationship between Aramaics settled in the south of Nippur and those from
certain  regions  of  Syria.  These  relations  were  beneficial  to  commercial  links,  especially  if  some
Aramaics  maintained  their  nomadic  lifestyle  and  moved  between  Syria  and  Babylon  with  their
animals78. Links of this nature exist in the eighth century between the Nippur region and certain tribes
settled at the foot of the Zagros in the Diyala region, thus aiding contact with Elam79. One may suggest
a similar analysis concerning the Arab tribes80 who settled increasingly in Babylon81.
71 Restö 2003, p. 119-266.
72 Meyers 1997. 
73 Jursa 2010, p. 224-225
74 Bedford 2007.
75 Cole 1996, Cole 1996b.
76 Cole 1996 n°1, Cole 1996 n°45.
77 According to Cole 1996, p. 27. See also Fales 2009 [2007], p. 289. 
78 About Arameans, see Brinkman 1968, Frame 2007 [1992], p. 43-48, Lipinski 2000, Briquel-Chatonnet 2003, Fales 2009
[2007]. Evidence is scarce for Neo-Babylonian times, but it seems that Arameans are not as well integrated and settled 
than Chaldeans are. After the mass deportation from the end of Neo-Assyrian times Arameans mix up with the general 
population, are remain silent in our sources. Only the major tribes of Gambulu and Puqudu can still be clearly identified 
after the VIIe century BC. Fales 2009 [2007], p. 297.
79 Cole 1996, p. 27-29, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 317.
80 Numerous cuneiform sources mention arrival of nomadic arabic tribes as soon as the beginning of VIII e century. Eph'al
1978, Frame 2007 [1992], p. 50 . Restö, p. 190 finds mention of LÚ Arabāya in at least 20 texts from Nippur, Sippar and
Uruk. Most of them date from from the time period 563-420: arab tribes are much more present in cuneiform sources
during Neo-Babylonian  and  achaemenid times  than  before.  Those  texts  show Arabs  involved in  various  economic
activities, some possess slaves, other are slaves themselves, some of them works for temples in Sippar evidence. A
specific arabian organisation, ālu ša arbāya is known in Sippar: in those times, arabic tribes seem to remain a distinct
group, but pretty well integrated in babylonian society, 
81 Other strangers appear in cuneiform evidence. Egyptians appear in commercial background (Frame 2007 [1992], p. 49 
and note 104, Eph'al 1978, p. 74-90), as well as Judeans (Jursa 2007).
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The arrival of these populations results in reduced costs of transactions with the North's 
acceptance of the concept. It results in a relative cultural homogeneity, when aramean becomes the 
lingua franca of the near East. It also contributes to reducing transport costs for goods when 
commodities are traveling with men and herds. This is confirmed indirectly by the relative wealth of 
western goods in Southern Babylon. Be it through Neo-Assyrian tributes or the acquisition of the Neo-
Babylonian temples, this region supplied gold and even purple fabric similar to that produced in 
Phoenician cities82. While it is difficult to prove, one wonders if its possible to identify these population
migrations as the much-discussed vehicle of importation of exotic goods which is so absent in our 
archival sources83. 
This new place taken by nomads groups leads to the same direction than the domestication of
camel:a new kind of commerce for exotic goods, dealing on longer distance, much more flexible than
before,  and much more  difficult  to  control  by local  authorities  as  well.  This  can bring to  clashes
between new groups involved in trade and local authorities which try to rule them84.  But,  in Neo-
Babylonian times, this rather leads to a high involvement in long distance trade of people either coming
from outside Mesopotamia, or recently settled there. This involvement has often been put forward to
explain the scarcity of cuneiform evidence dealing with long-distance trade: this trade would nearly
become a monopole of non-akkadian people during Neo-Babylonian times85. Those new actors do not
write in cuneiform. If they use some script, it is on perishable written medium, which explains why no
written source remains for this period. But this point, often repeated, is not enough to explain why
cuneiform-writing population withdrew from this economic activity. To answer this difficult and crucial
question the kind of reasoning proposed by D. C. North can prove to be helpful. D. C. North actually
stresses the place of institutions and of transaction costs  to explain economic change in history.  A
change in institutions can allow a lowering of transactions costs, that can, as a result, make possible
some  new  economic  behaviour.  But,  to  the  contraty,  they  can  also  prevent  appearance  of  new
behaviour, or prevent some populations to take part to the economic change, when the institutional
background does not change according to what would be necessary to allow a change in economic
system. The transaction costs remains to high, and the economic change is impossible. Following this
idea, the aim of this paper is to propose the idea that there is, in Neo-Babylonian time, a standstill in
institutional framework which prevents babylonian businessmen from finding their place in the new
long-distance trade network. Because of that, babylonians do not take advantage of the new kind of
trade which arose in the second part of the first millenium BC.
To understand from where this institutional standstill is coming from, let us review the changes,
or lack thereof, in institutions, in the broad acceptance of the word advised by D. C. North, that could
impact the babylonian involvement in long distance trade.  The existence of a simplified system of
weight and measurement was a significant development. In Neo-Assyrian texts, the measurement of
weight still lacks standardization, leading to a great deal of difficulties and errors, be they intentional or
not86. In Neo-Babylonian texts, the system is much simpler. We no longer find mention of the different
82 For chaldeans tributes, see Jankowska 1969, Graslin-Thomé 2009, p. 317-319. In PTS 3068 quoted above, gold, bronze 
and trade goods are to be found in Chaldea. For the economic links with Sealands, see Kleber 2008, p. 326-329. 
83 The question to know from where the trade goods present in Sealands are coming is still pending. Jursa 2010, p. 93 
thinks that they come from a southern route, but Byrne 2003 questions the very existence of direct trade routes between 
Arabia and Babylonia before persian times. In Neo-Babylonian texts, the arabs tribes always come from the west, and 
ride down the Euphrates. The entrance gate to Babylonia for caravans is, therefore, the middle Euphrates.
84 A well known example is the ambush set by Ninurta-Kudurri-Uşur, governor of Suhu in the middle Euphrates to a 
caravan of camels coming from the West. Liverani. 1992.
85 Oppenheim 1969, Dandamayev 1986, Jursa 2010, p. 224 for example.
86 Muller 2004 give several examples of additions of quantities expressed in minas who seems wrong to modern scholars. 
They have often been taken as a sign of the low calculation skills of the scribes, but may rather be the accurate result, 
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terms which abound in Neo-Assyrian texts87. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity remains a reality and the
multiplicity of terms used to define the quality of  silver88 is significant: payment remains a complex
transaction89, requiring the weighing of metal which did not protect against a quality of silver inferior to
that expected. Costs linked to the weighing contribute to transaction costs remaining high, while the
risks  associated  with  the  quality  of  the  metal  received were  high  enough to  decisively  encourage
exchanges concluded with known and well-trusted partners. On the other hand, the establishment of a
more monetary economy is favorable to the reduction of transactions costs and the development of
exchanges. If we are to accept the conclusions of M. Jursa90, money becomes increasingly used in
transactions in the sixth century. The proportion of money-based exchange will be a subject of debate
among Assyriologists. It  has,  in any case,  a significant influence on transaction costs: it  simplifies
exchanges and limits risks. M. Stolper has already demonstrated how the increasing reliance on money,
mostly for fiscal reasons, has led to the development of entrepreneurial activity by private businessmen
acting on behalf of the palace or the temples91. Local commerce has benefited as a result. But we have
seen that its effect is non-existent in the realm of long distance commerce which remains a secondary
activity for the so-called «entrepreneurs92». It is as if the broadened use of money had opened them to a
large set of local or regional economic activities, enough for the ambition of wealthy businessmen, who
do  not  need  to  expand  their  activities  into  long-distance  commerce.  In  this  case,  a  institutional
evolution leads to what could appear, from the babylonian point of view, as a withdraw from some
activities.
An explanation for this blockage can also come from the dysfunction of other institutions, in the
meaning given by D. C. North. The accounting procedures93, or the slowness in adaptation to new
economical behaviour94 could be part of the answer. The contracts, an other institution in the meaning
given by D. C. North, probably played a role as well. Economic theory explains that contracts, be these
formal or tacit in nature, are a way to reduce the risk involved by exchange.  The purpose of these
contracts was to limit the risks associated with transactions. In this matter, the long-distance commerce
adhered to rules which were fundamentally different to local exchange. In the latter, in case of cheat, it
is  possible  to plead to  local  authorities,  even if  dishonesty has been discovered in  retrospect.  The
parties are likely to know one another, or at least to be able to find one another, if they realize that
things the deal hasn’t been carried out according to the rules. By contrast, long-distance trade occurs
between parties who do not know one another and are likely never to meet again. It is, in this context,
much  more  difficult  to  guarantee  respect  for  the  rules.  Trade  in  gold  is  a  good  example  of  this
difficulty. One text tells of agents from Eanna who bought gold in Babylon and hastened to verify its
quality upon their return to Uruk95. Mesopotamian techniques governing the quality of gold consisted
of melting down a portion of the metal and this could only be done once the agents return home 96. At
incomprehensible for us because of the high complexity of the units of measure. 
87 Powell 1990.
88 Joannès 1994, Vargyas 2000, Jursa 2010, p. 474-490.
89 A text from the Nur-Sin archiv (Wunsch 1993, nº65) deals with onions sold against a silver ingot. It foresees that the 
ingot will be cut by the buyer, not by the seller: M. Jursa 2010, p.  479 proposes that this clause can be due to the fact 
that the seller, a rural farmer does not know how to cut a large piece of silver, and prefers to trust the buyer, a 
bussinessman better accustomed to such a delicate task.
90 Conclusions presented in Jursa 2010.
91 Stolper 1985.
92 The word «entrepreneur» has been advocated by van Driel 1999, and often taken over in latter literature, with sometimes
slightly different acceptances. See, for example, Graslin Vivel 2005, Jursa 2010.
93 Jursa 2004, Graslin-Thomé 2015.
94 Jursa 2010, Graslin-Thomé 2014. See below.
95 YOS VI 112, l. 23.
96 Joannès 1987, Joannès 1994.
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this stage, it is a little late to think of returning to confront potential fraudsters. There is no legal way
for the administration of the temple to react if the metal's quality does not meet expectations. As such,
no  judicial  framework  exists  to  protect  merchants  and  enable  commerce  on  a  large  scale.  It  is
understandable how, under these circumstances, the sanctuaries entrust the supply of primary materials
to specialists: their weathered eye is the best means of guaranteeing the acceptable quality of the goods
procured.
However,  the  juridical  framework  of  long-distance  trade  is  an  unsolved  problem  in  Neo-
Babylonian times. It does not provide merchants with the protection they desire. The Neo-Babylonian
era hardly sees any development in the protection and legal  control  of large-scale commerce.  The
contracts are well-known: the merchants use contracts known as harrānu-contrats, literally «contrats of
the caravan». But, despite their name related to long-distance trade, those contracts are, in reality, a
means of gathering capital for a variety of reasons97, usually on a very local scale. There is no specific
formula for commercial transactions, let alone for long distance trade. There is therefore no specific
clause precisely designed to respond to specific needs of long distance trade, most of all the difficult
but essential protection against the risk. 
Because of this lack of appropriate juridical framework, people involved in long distance trade
have to look for other systems of protection against the risks specific to their activity98. One strategy
may perhaps be revealed through YOS XIX 1. In this document a big house is given to Šamaš-zēr-ibni,
against exotic goods, listed in the contract. To pay the capital in the form of a house ensures that the
person entrusted with the money will not disappear without having delivered the merchandise. This
measure has its limits, however, as is demonstrated in another text, AnOr VIII 70: in this text we learn
that Eanna had to initiate legal proceedings to recuperate,after ten years, a house entrusted as capital for
the commercial goods. On the whole, Neo-Babylonians involved in long distance trade seems to lack
legal protection against risk. The need to find other means to protect themselves may explain that the
temple prefers to deal with individuals whose reliability can be guaranteed in some manner: agents of
the king, or merchants they already know. It may also explain the dearth of evidence of exchanges with
suppliers who have come from afar. In other words, long distance commerce, in the absence of any
legal framework, appears too risky and it is preferable to deal with well-known partners. In any case
there is no visible technical development during this period of contract law which might encourage the
expansion of large-scale commerce.
This lack of legal background well adapted to long-distance trade may explain why babylonian
businessmen do not invest in this kind of economic activity: M. Jursa has shown that most babylonian
families that have enough money to invest in economy are for the most part of them «risk-averse»: they
prefer to invest their money in activities where investment return is predictible99, even if they are not as
profitable as more hazardous ones. It is the case of the prebendary families labeled by M. Jursa as
«rentiers»: for those wealthy families, the money is mainly used to secure or expand the family rural
possessions. The «entrepreneurs», as M. Jursa calls an other kind of wealthy businessmen, accept to
run more risk, but there activities are mainly local: agricultural business, providing cash for the crown,
or other profit-gathering activities. The temples administrators behavior is close from the rentiers one:
they avoid the risk and are not seeking the more profitable way to handle their possessions. That is how
Ebabbar prefers to entrust outsiders to sell the bulk of its date production. This choice prevent the
temple to get the best profite he could expect from his production, and makes it dependent to the main
97 Lanz 1976, Joannès 1983, Jursa 2010, p. 206-214.
98 Graslin-Thomé, in press a.
99 Iddin-Marduk is a good example of «risk-averse» entrepreneurs: he prefers to buy in advance the onions production that 
he will eventually sell in Babylon. In this way, he does not support the incertainty of a good or bad harvest. He reduces 
the risk of loss, but of unexpected gains as well. Graslin 2002, Graslin-Thomé in press a.
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traders100. But it simplify the task of the administrators, and lows the risk their risk exposure. This
behavioral choice can explain that neither temples nor well-being temple families choose to involve in
long-distance trade: the juridical framework is not designed to reduce the risk sufficiently to encourage
them to invest their money. Local business suffices for the small part of businessmen eager to face
more risk, for higher gains. They content themselves with local and regional business, especially as the
institutional framework which does not change in the case of long-distance trade, is touched by several
improvement as far as local business is concerned.
The result, even if institutional development is occurring, and that they could, in theory,
benefit long-distance commerce, is that the effect of such transformations is not very significant. While
it is true that archival sources are few, this lack of evidence shows that long-distance commerce is not a
favored domain for entrepreneurs. Within the big institutions, commerce held in trust continues to be
significant, while private operators stay in the background.  The institutional framework, in the sense
given by D. C. North, is definitely evolving but at too slow a pace and in too incomplete a manner to
inspire entrepreneurs to devote either energy or capital into it from other activities. As a result the
distinction  between  local  and  long-distance  commerce  is  significant.  Major  institutional  changes,
notably the growing move to a monetary economy, leads to the development of a dynamic business
class. However the associated drawbacks appear to be a persistently poor adaptation by the institutions
to long-distant commerce.  This remains too prevalent to encourage entrepreneurs to invest in such
projects. Babylonian businessmen choose to invest their capitals and energy in the enlarged local and
regional activities permitted by economic change. This economic change has an opposite effect on
long-distance trade: the changes exist, but are, from the babylonian point of view, less interesting than
the changes which impacted local and regional economic activities. They therefore are used by other
populations,  newcomers  in  Babylonia,  who  capture  to  their  benefit  the  changes  ignored  by
Babylonians.
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